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COMMENTS
THE WAR ON CRIME INCREASES THE TIME: SENTENCING POLICIES
IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA
I. INTRODUCTION
"Distrust all men in whom the impulse to punish is
powerful."1
Crime is more than just a national problem. Today, global
interdependence means increased travel, communication, and
contact between the nations of the world. As a result of this
extensive international contact, it is only logical that crime and the
response to crime should be international concerns as well. It is
ironic that the United States-a major world power in technology
and development-is plagued with crime today.2  The United
States is now recognized as a having one of the largest
incarcerated populations in the world.
3
As crime levels increase, governments respond by either
increasing funding to law enforcement and correctional facilities
4
or reforming sentencing measures. 5 This Comment analyzes the
role of strict sentencing policies as a mechanism for curtailing
increased crime rates, and compares sentencing procedures in the
1. Freidrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, quoted in MICHAEL JACKMAN, CROWN'S BOOK OF
POLITICAL QUOTATIONS 122 (1st ed. 1982).
2. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS:
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL USE OF INCARCERATION, 1995 1, 35 (1997).
3. See id.
4. See Jeff Builta, Crime on the Increase, CRIME & JUST. EUR., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 1,
6 (reporting that in response to studies and increased international attention focusing on
the worsening of South Africa's crime problems, President Nelson Mandela vowed to give
a more favorable response to requests for increased police funding).
5. "The [Sentence Reform] Act was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act,
whose purpose was to address the problem of crime in society." UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM i (1991).
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United States6 and South Africa. 7 This Comment demonstrates
that strict sentencing requirements are an inadequate solution to
heightened levels of crime by comparing and contrasting the
sentencing policies, crime rates, and incarceration practices of
these two countries. This purported solution for dealing with
rising crime rates is directed solely at recidivists. 8 The goal of
these Draconian sentencing measures, such as the novel U.S.
mandatory minimum sentencing 9 and Three-Strikes1 ° approaches,
is to incarcerate offenders for longer time periods.
Unfortunately, the application of these responses to
heightened crime rates in both the United States and South Africa
is ineffective. For example, the United States adopted a rigid
sentencing guideline policy, mandatory minimum sentencing laws,
and the federal Three-Strikes law-all of which skyrocketed the
country's imprisoned population and pumped billions of dollars
into the prison system.11 Statistics illustrate that these laws do not
6. See JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (3d ed.
1996). "From an international perspective, American society is distinctive for both its
crime and its punishment: It has both vastly more crime and vastly more punishment than
any other prosperous democracy." Id. For a discussion comparing the violent crime and
incarceration rates of the United States and other wealthy democracies, see id. at 29 tbl.1.
This Comment explores the relationship between crime rates and sentencing polices in the
United States because of the radical measures the United States employs in its efforts to
eradicate recidivism.
7. See Builta, supra note 4, at 6 (explaining the sharp crime increase in South Africa
along with record-breaking reports of serious crime in 1994). This Comment compares
South African crime and punishment laws with those of the United States because South
Africa's crime rate is excessive and constantly rising.
8. See Meredith McClain, Note, 'Three Strikes and You're Out': The Solution to the
Repeat Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 99-100 (1996) (explaining that
the increased sentences in the United States are directed at repeat offenders). See also
generally Martin Schonteich, Gov't and Opposition Need to Do Homework Urgently, BUS.
DAY (Johannesburg), May 21, 1999, Perspectives, at 13 (noting that South Africa's
response to increased crime is to create stricter statutes). A "recidivist" is "a second
offender; a 'habitual criminal'; often subject to extended terms of imprisonment under
habitual offender statutes." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (4th ed. 1996).
9. See Michael M. Baylson, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: A Federal Prosecutor's
Viewpoint, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 167, 167 (1993) ("Mandatory minimums are designed to
guarantee a minimum sentence for all individuals convicted of a given offense.").
10. See Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense?
Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103, 103 (1998)
(explaining that many state and federal governments implement Three-Strikes laws
mandating long or life prison terms for offenders who commit three serious or violent
felonies). See also id. at 103 n.1.
11. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: A
COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL RATES OF INCARCERATION 3, 7 (1991). See also
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work because crime levels have remained consistently high since
their implementation.
12
While South Africa has mandatory minimum sentencing
legislation, it does not have a rigid sentencing guideline policy, as
does the United States. 13 South Africa's downfall, however, stems
from its people's distrust of the law enforcement system 14 and the
crime rebellion resulting therefrom. 15  In addition, the South
African judiciary, as a whole, has a wide range of sentencing
discretion. 16 This heightened judicial discretion, along with the
absence of a jury system, seems to be a direct result of the fact that
white male judges dominated the judicial branch in South Africa
before the abolition of apartheid.
17
Part II of this Comment compares the government
institutions responsible for creating sentencing policies .and
guidelines in South Africa and the United States. Part III
examines the punishment theories underlying these sentencing
policies. Next, Part IV compares the specific categories of drug
laws in each country and provides a working example of
mandatory minimum sentencing laws and the strict sentences they
produce. Part V deals with the effects of increased sentencing
penalties on minorities, specifically focusing on African-
Americans in the United States and blacks in South Africa. Part
VI proposes alternatives available to both countries to successfully
Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at 107.
12. See Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at 104-105.
13. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998)
[hereinafter USSG]. See also generally infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the creation of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
14. See Builta, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing the growing trend of hiring private
security services, which is one of the most profitable industries in South Africa, employing
over 150,000 people).
15. See id. (providing evidence of this crime rebellion; for example, a week prior to
elections, fifty-seven police were murdered in Gautueng and eight police were murdered
in Johannesburg).
16. See WILFRIED SCHARF & RONA COCHRANE, WORLD FACTBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICA, Penalties and Sentencing Section, para. 1 (visited Oct.
5, 1999) <http://blackstone.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjsaf.txt> (explaining that except
where legislation clearly mandates a sentence, the presiding officer determines the
sentence).
17. See id. Judicial Systems Section, para. 3 (describing the primarily white make-up
of the judicial branch and the qualifications and appointment procedures for judges). See
also infra note 53 (describing the racial make-up of the judicial branch in 1993). See
SCHARF & COCHRANE, supra note 16, Penalties and Sentencing Section, para. 1 (noting
that there is no jury system in South Africa).
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deal with the onslaught of rising crime. Lastly, this Comment
concludes that the "war on crime increases the time" policy that
the United States and South Africa currently implement is an
inadequate solution to the increased crime rates problem.
II. WHO DETERMINES THE SENTENCE: BALANCING THE SCALES
OF LIBERTY
A. The U.S. Federal Sentencing Scheme
1. The Federal Sentencing Commission
Congress had clear goals in mind when it passed the
Sentencing Reform Act 18 in 1984, thereby forming the Federal
Sentencing Commission (U.S. Sentencing Commission). 19 In
creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Congress hoped "to
promote determinate sentencing, abolish parole, insure
proportionality and uniformity in sentencing, and limit
sentencing discretion.
'" 20
The members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, an
independent component of the judicial branch of government,
21
are selected through detailed statutory procedures.22 What the
U.S. Sentencing Commission lacks in numbers, it makes up for in
might. Having only seven voting members and two non-voting ex
officio members, 23  the U.S. Sentencing Commission sets
18. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1994)).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994).
20. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 108.
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
22. The following is an example of the detailed U.S. Sentencing Commission selection
process as mandated by statute:
The President, after consultation with representatives of judges, prosecuting
attorneys, defense attorneys, law enforcement officials, senior citizens, victims of
crime, and others interested in the criminal justice process, shall appoint the
voting members of the Commission, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, one of whom shall be appointed, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, as the Chair and three of whom shall be designated by the President
as Vice Chairs. At least three of the members shall be Federal judges selected
after considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the
Judicial Conference of the United States. Not more than four of the members of
the Commission shall be members of the same political party, and of the three
Vice Chairs, no more than two shall be members of the same political party.
Id.
23. See McClain, supra note 8, at 102 n.26.
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guidelines for the entire U.S. judicial system.
Section 991(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides that the
purposes of the U.S. Sentencing Commission are:
(1) establish sentencing policies and practice for the Federal
criminal justice system that-
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set
forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted
by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in
the establishment of the general sentencing practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal
justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the
sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective of
meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.
24
2. The U.S. Judge's Role in Sentencing
The U.S. Sentencing Commission created guidelines to
encompass all federal crimes; the first guidelines took effect in
1987.25 Before a judge sentences a defendant, the judge must first
24. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(2) (1994) mandates that
the purpose of a sentence is:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with the needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(2).
25. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 108-109. See also R. Daniel O'Connor, Note,
Defining the Strike Zone-An Analysis of the Classification of Prior Convictions Under the
Federal "Three-Strikes and You're Out" Scheme, 36 B.C. L. REV. 847, 855 (1995). See
generally USSG, supra note 13.
379
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employ a three-step process to determine the appropriate
sentence. 26 First, the judge consults a schedule, 27 which delineates
the "base offense level" 28 for the particular offense at issue. 29
Next, using the offender's prior convictions, the judge tabulates
the "criminal history score." 30  Finally, the judge uses a two-
dimensional grid to calculate the offender's presumptive
sentence.31 Theoretically, the guidelines should obliterate the
gross inconsistencies in the federal sentencing process.32
It is important to note, however, that federal sentencing
guidelines allow judges to consider mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. 33 Thus, it is possible for judges to manipulate the
guidelines from their rawest form of the presumptive sentence.
For example, in United States v. Floyd,34 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a departure from the original guidelines and
reduced a sentence from thirty to seventeen years.35 The court
cited the defendant's "lack of guidance and education" as the
reason for its departure from the sentencing guidelines.
36
26. See generally O'Connor, supra note 25, at 855-856 (summarizing the use of
sentencing guidelines).
27. A schedule establishes the base score for a given offense. The score can increase
and decrease based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See KAPLAN ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 109. For an example of a robbery schedule, see id. at 109 tbl.1.
28. The "base offense level" is the presumptive figure the judge should use when
consulting the sentencing tables in the federal guidelines. This base level can increase or
decrease depending on specific offense characteristics and aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. See USSG § 1B1.1(b)-(c), supra note 13, at 12.
29. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 109.
30. Id. (noting that the "criminal history score" is mostly just a measure of prior
convictions).
31. See id. A "presumptive sentence" is the sentence that is presumed appropriate
based on his or her "criminal history score" and the "base offense level." See id. For an
example of the configurations used to decide a given sentence, see id. at 110-111 tbl.2.
32. See id. at 108. See also Baylson, supra note 9, at 169.
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
34. 945 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1991).
35. See id. at 1097, 1098-1102.
36. Id. at 1097, 1098. Note, however, that a judge's opportunity to depart from the
guidelines is very limited. The judge must show that "there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from ... [the guidelines]." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In addition, departures
for conventional reasons, for example the sentence's potential effect on the defendant's
dependants or employment status, are expressly prohibited. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra
note 6, at 112. Moreover, application of the guidelines does not depend on the offense to
which the defendant pled guilty or of which the defendant is convicted at trial. See id. The
guidelines require instead that the "actual offense behavior" be used as the "relevant
380
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3. Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums
Sentencing guidelines are often compared to mandatory
minimum sentencing laws. 37 Mandatory minimum sentencing laws
prohibit any departure from a mandated sentence, unless the
prosecutor motions for such departure. 38  For example, a
prosecutor can motion for a departure for an individual who
provides "substantial assistance in the prosecution of another."
39
Some judges argue that because of the prosecutor's ability to
depart from mandated sentences, mandatory minimums have
shifted the power of sentencing discretion from judges to
prosecutors. 40 With sentencing guidelines, however, there may be
less need for mandatory minimums because the purpose of the
guidelines is to reduce sentencing disparity and enable uniformity
in sentencing.41 Furthermore, the federal Three-Strikes law
42
conduct" in sentencing the offender. See id.
37. See Baylson, supra note 9, at 169.
38. See id. at 168.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 168-169. For example, Judge Forer, a Philadelphia trial judge, left the
bench when mandatory minimum sentencing laws required her to sentence a man to five
years in prison for committing a non-violent, unarmed robbery, in which he stole fifty
dollars from a taxi driver and passenger. See LOIS FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH 2 (1994).
In addition, the defendant paid the money back, was employed, and was supporting his
family by the time he was re-sentenced. See id. at 3-4. Judge Forer wanted to sentence
the defendant to a shorter prison term, a long probationary period, and require that he
repay the money he stole-the victims did not object to the hybrid sentence Judge Forer
proposed. See id. Nevertheless, the prosecutor demanded a five-year sentence under the
mandatory sentencing law. See id.
41. See Baylson, supra note 9, at 169.
42. The Three-Strikes law targets recidivists in two categories: (1) those with two
prior serious violent felony convictions; and (2) those with both a serious violent
conviction and a serious drug conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994). This law
mandates that an offender falling within either category be sentenced to a life term. See
id. State "Three-Strikes" statutes, discussion of which is outside the scope of this
Comment, may be drafted differently. The term "serious violent felony" means:
(i) a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation and wherever committed,
consisting of murder... ; manslaughter other than involuntary manslaughter...
assault with intent to commit murder... ; assault with intent to commit rape ...
(ii) any other offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10
years or more that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another ....
Id. § 3559(2)(F)(i)-(ii).
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serves as a catchall "safety net," to deter criminals from repeating
crime by threatening them with lifelong imprisonment.43
At first glance, it appears that the United States conceived a
foolproof sentencing scheme for reducing crime, eliminating
sentencing inconsistencies, and punishing repeat offenders. Upon
closer inspection, however, these measures evince a different
picture: one laden with loopholes and potential inconsistencies.
B. The South African Sentencing Scheme
1. The National Council for Correctional Services
South Africa's sentencing branch, the National Council for
Correctional Services (South African Council), 44 is similar in
purpose and form to the U.S. Sentencing Commission.45 Like the
members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, all members of the
South African Council are appointed.46  The South African
Council, however, has a greater number of members than does the
U.S. Sentencing Commission.47 Further, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission issues strict guidelines, whereas the South African
Council legislates in more of an ad hoc manner.48
As provided by the Correctional Services Act, the duties of
the South African Council are as follows:
(1) The primary function of the [Council] is to advise, at the
request of the Minister or on its own accord, in developing
policy in regards to the correctional system and the sentencing
process.
(2) The Minister must refer the draft legislation and major
proposed policy developments regarding the correctional
system to the National Council for its comments and advice.
43. See Mario M. Cuomo, 'Three Strikes'- Two Views Harsh, Sure, But Fair, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at A19.
44. See § 84 of Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (S. Afr.). The National Council
referred to herein is the Council for Correctional Services, see id. § 1. For more on the
duties of the National Council, see id. § 84.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1994).
46. See § 83(2)(a)-(h) of Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998.
47. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) with § 83(2)(a)-(h) of Correctional Services Act 111
of 1998.
48. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 994 with § 84 of Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998.
[Vol. 22:375
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(3) The Commissioner must provide the necessary information
and resources to enable the National Council to perform its
primary function.
(4) The National Council may examine any aspect of the
correctional system and refer any appropriate matter to the
Inspecting Judge.
49
The language of the above statute, namely "[t]he National Council
may examine any aspect of the correctional system," seems to give
unbridled discretion to members of the South African Council.
This statute also illustrates that the South African Council has the
power to legislate in a more ad hoc fashion than does the U.S.
Sentencing Commission. The South African Council is not limited
to mere sentencing issues, but rather is free to examine any aspect
of the correctional system. 50
2. The South African Judge's Role in Sentencing
"[C]ourts are independent and subject only to the
Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and
without fear, favour or prejudice;" 51 "[n]o person or organ may
interfere with the functioning of the courts." 52  These quotes
suggest that after the South African Council promulgates the
sentencing statutes, the judges' decisions in applying and
interpreting these statutes become the law of the land.53 South
49. § 84 of Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. The term "Minister" means the
Minister of Correctional Services. See id. § 1. The term "Commissioner" means the
Commissioner of the Correctional Services. See id.
50. For example, in May 1999, 6,000 inmates were reportedly released to ebb the
overflowing prison population. See News24.com, Plans to free 6,000 convicts 'absolute
nonsense', May 20, 1999 (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http://news.24.com/archive/
english/southafrica/south africa/ENG_51178_384104_SEO.asp>.
51. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 165(2).
52. Id. § 165(3). The following statute serves as an example of the discretion South
African judges' are allowed in determining appropriate sentences:
(1) A person liable to a sentence of imprisonment for life or any period, may be
sentenced to imprisonment for any shorter period, and a person liable to a
sentence of a fine of any amount may be sentenced to a fine of any lesser
amount.
(2) The provision of subsection (1) shall not apply with reference to any offence
for which a minimum penalty is prescribed in the law creating the offence or
prescribing a penalty therefor.
§ 283 of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (S. Afr.).
53. As of 1993, the South African judicial branch was primarily composed of whites.
See SCHARF & COCHRANE, supra note 16, Judicial System Section, para. 3. "There [were]
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Africa's laws allow judges to impose sentences for indefinite
amounts of time, 54 thereby allotting judges a great deal of
discretion, unlike U.S. sentencing guidelines and mandatory
minimum sentencing laws.
3. Mandatory Minimum and Maximum Sentences
South Africa has minimum sentencing statutes similar to the
U.S. mandatory minimum statutes. 55 Unlike the U.S. statutes,
146 Judges of the Supreme Court. There [was] only one woman Judge. There [was] one
Indian Judge. All other Judges [were] white males." Id. The fact that the judges had such
wide discretion over sentencing could be attributable to the old apartheid system. It was
only in 1994 that the first South African democratic elections were held guaranteeing
human rights for all. See Annenberg/CPB, South Africa: Can a country overcome its
history? (visited Mar. 20, 2000) http://www/learner.org/exhibits/southafrica/>. As a result,
the wide discretion these judges received could be a product of the pre-apartheid era in
which whites dominated and governed South Africa in all aspects. See Annenberg/CPB,
South Africa, Apartheid: The Beginning (visited Mar. 20, 2000)
http://www/learner.org/exhibits/southafrica/ aparthied.html>.
54. See, e.g., § 286B of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, Imprisonment for
indefinite period, which provides:
(1) The Court which declares a person a dangerous criminal shall-
(a) sentence such person to undergo imprisonment for an indefinite period;
and (b) direct that such person be brought before the court on the
expiration of a period determined by it, which shall not exceed the
jurisdiction of the court....
(4)(a) Whenever a court reconsiders a sentence in terms of this section, it shall
have the same powers as it would have had if it were considering sentence after
conviction of a person...
(b) After a court has considered a sentence in terms of this section, it may-
(i) confirm the sentence of imprisonment for an indefinite period, in which
case the court shall direct that such person be brought before the court on
the expiration of a further period determined by it, which shall not exceed
the jurisdiction of the court;
(ii) convert the sentence into correctional supervision on the conditions it
deems fit; or
(iii) release the person unconditionally or on such conditions as it deems fit.
Id. § 286B(1), (4).
55. See, e.g., § 51 of Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997:
(2) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a
regional court or a High Court shall -
(a) if it has convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part II of Schedule 2,
sentence the person, in case of-
(i) a first offender, to imprisonment for a period not less than 15 years;
(ii) a second offender of any such offense, to imprisonment for a period not
less than 20 years; and
(iii) a third or subsequent offender of any such offense to imprisonment for
a period not less than 25 years ....
Id. Because drug trafficking has become a major concern in South Africa since the
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however, South Africa's mandatory minimum statutes allow courts
very little discretion. 56 Moreover, South Africa's statutes specify
different types of sentencing, 57 and contain maximum sentence
laws that create a sentencing ceiling, which prison terms cannot
exceed. 58 In contrast to South Africa,59 the U.S. court system has
no formalized maximum sentencing policy, with the exception of
some individual federal statutes.60 Instead, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines provide all necessary formulas for each particular
offense.
61
The main parties involved in the sentencing process are the
judge, the prosecutor, and the accused.62 The prosecutor and the
accused argue about circumstances before the judge to either
increase or mitigate the offender's sentence.63 The judges' can
involve other parties in the sentencing process; for example, South
African courts employ a unique feature called an assessor
system. 64 Once a defendant is found guilty, the judge appoints an
assessor, who is a member of the community, to decide whether a
region's political and economic opening, see Builta, supra note 4, at 6, some of these
narcotic and drug smuggling statutes will be discussed herein. See infra Part IV.B.
56. See SCHARF & COCHRANE, supra note 16, Penalties and Sentencing Section, para.
1.
57. The South African judicial system imposes a variety of different criminal
sentences. "The following penalties are presently in use: a jail sentence with the possibility
of a fine, periodic imprisonment, being declared a habitual or dangerous criminal, being
placed in an institution such as a juvenile reformatory, a fine, corporal punishment,
community service, correctional supervision, caution or reprimand .. " Id. Penalties and
Sentencing Section, para. 2.
58. See id. Penalties and Sentencing Section, para. 1.
59. See § 17(e) of Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 (S. Ar.) (maximum
sentence statute).
60. Because of U.S. consecutive sentencing and mitigating/aggravating circumstances
practices, both of which potentially add numerous years to an original sentence, an
offender's sentence may be virtually unlimited.
61. See generally USSG, supra note 13. See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining how U.S.
judges calculate sentences pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
62. See id.
63. See id.; see also § 274 of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (S. Afr.), which reads:
(1) A Court may, before passing sentence, receive such evidence as it thinks fit
in order to inform itself as to the proper sentence to be passed.
(2) The accused may address the court on any evidence received under
subsection (1), as well as on the matter of the sentence, and thereafter the
prosecution may likewise address the court.
Id.
64. See SCHARF & COCHRANE, supra note 16, Penalties and Sentencing Section, para.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
community-based sentence is appropriate.65  Because South
African courts do not utilize juries, judges seem armed with an
unbridled amount of discretion.
66
C. Comparing the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the South
African Council
The U.S. Sentencing Commission and the South African
Council serve similar functions in creating sentences: they both
advise the appropriate legislative bodies on the policy for their
respective sentencing processes. 67 The South African Council is
much larger in size than the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and it is
composed of members involved in all aspects of civil service-the
U.S. Sentencing Commission draws from a small civil service
pool. 6
8
The major difference, however, between the South African
Council and the U.S. Sentencing Commission is the power and
discretion their respective judicial branches receive in imposing
sentences. The South African Council imparts a great degree of
autonomy to its judges in delegating the form and length of
sentences, 69 provided there is no mandatory minimum or
maximum sentencing requirement already in place for the
particular crime at issue.70  In contrast, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission established sentencing guidelines and implemented a
mandatory mode of operation that judges must follow.71
Although the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the South African
Council are responsible for sentencing determinations, it is equally
important to examine the theories of punishment behind
sentencing to understand why certain sentences are conferred.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Compare supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the U.S. Sentencing Commission's role in
developing the Sentencing Guidelines) with supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the National
Council's role in developing sentencing policy).
68. Compare § 83(2)(a)-(h) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (S. Aft.)
with 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994).
69. See SCHARF & COCHRANE, supra note 16, Penalties and Sentencing Section, para.
1.
70. See generally supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the judges' discretion once the Council
has established a sentence for an offense).
71. See generally supra Part II.A.3 (describing the judicial sentence calculation
process).
[Vol. 22:375
2000] Sentencing Policies in the U.S. and South Africa 387
III. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
A. Background
There are two main schools of thought underlying the
theories of punishment: retributivism and utilitarianism.72 The
retributivist believes that punishment is merely a way of giving
criminals their just desserts.73 This belief is similar to the Mosaic74
laws of biblical times dictating the retributive theory of an"[e]ye
for an eye." 75 According to the Retributivist view, "the severity of
the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of [the
criminal's] ... act."
76
The utilitarian, on the other hand, considers punishment in
light of potential future consequences. 77 This philosophy does not
consider the offender's past wrongs.78 Utilitarianism presupposes
that "[i]f punishment can be shown to promote effectively the
interest of society[,] it is justifiable, otherwise it is not. '79 This
utilitarian perspective speaks to the main theories of crime
prevention: deterrence, reformation, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation.80
B. The Theories of Punishment
1. Deterrence
Generally, the premise underlying the deterrence theory of
punishment is that the fear of punishment by imprisonment will
discourage both the offender and potential offenders from
committing future crimes. 81 For effective deterrence, however,
certain prerequisites must be fulfilled. These requirements are as
follows: first, the risk of being apprehended must outweigh the
72. See KAPLAN ET AL.,supra note 6, at 35.
73. See id. at 37.
74. "Mosaic" means "[from] Moses[,] Biblical prophet and lawgiver[;] ... of or
relating to Moses or the institutions or writings attributed to him." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1473 (1986).
75. Exodus 21:24 (King James).




80. See id. at 36.
81. See Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at 112-113, 113 n.58.
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benefits of committing the offense; 82 second, the severity of the
punishment should increase as the likelihood of catching the
offender decreases; 83 and, finally, if two offenses are committed,
the more severe offense should receive a longer sentence, thereby
providing an incentive for the offender to stop at the lesser
crime.84 The United States and South Africa both practice some
form of deterrence. 85 In fact, both countries recognizably have
maintained the highest recorded incarceration rates throughout
the past decade.
86
2. Reformation and Rehabilitation
The basis of the reformation theory of punishment is that
imprisonment extinguishes a person's desire to commit future
crimes after his or her release from imprisonment.87 Reformation
involves helping prisoners via educational and therapeutic
programs.88 U.S. penitentiaries were initially established solely on
the premise of rehabilitating criminals.89 The institutions were
intended to be models of proper social organization created to
reform criminals. 90 For example, these institutions kept inmates
in isolation while establishing routines for discipline. 91 "[T]hey
believed that a setting which removed the offender from all
temptations and substituted a steady and regular regimen would
reform him." 92 The only logical conclusion from history is that
criminal sentencing in the early 1820s in the United States served
primarily rehabilitative purposes. 93  Conversely, modern U.S.
82. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 40.
83. See id. at 41.
84. See id.
85. The purpose of specific deterrence is to discourage the offender at hand with
imprisonment; the purpose of general deterrence is to discourage other potential
offenders. See Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at 112-113.
86. See MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 2, at 3-5. See also MAUER,
supra note 11, at 3-5 (explaining that 1991 was the first year in which the United States'
recorded rates of incarceration surpassed South Africa's. Before that time, South Africa
and the Soviet Union were the leaders in incarceration rates).
87. See Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at 113.
88. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 46.
89. See id. at 46-47.
90. See id. at 47. See also Francis T. Murphy, Moral Accountability and the
Rehabilitative Ideal, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1984, reprinted in AMERICA'S PRISONS OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS 17, 18 (David L. Bender et al. eds., 5th ed. 1991).
91. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 47-48.
92. Id. at 48.
93. See generally id. at 47-48 (describing the competing rationales behind the purpose
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recidivist statutes focus on incapacitating prisoners.
94
Compared to U.S. statutes, South Africa's statutory
requirements provide a wide range of opportunities to rehabilitate
prisoners.95  Unfortunately, like U.S. laws, South Africa's
recidivist statutes also focus largely on incapacitating prisoners.
96
Nonetheless, South Africa has not completely abandoned the
notion of rehabilitation within its sentencing and statutory
schemes. 97  For instance, the purpose of South Africa's
correctional system is "[to] promot[e] the social responsibility and
human development of all prisoners . *."..98 The two countries,
however, seem to mirror each other in that they both turn to




Incapacitation is premised on the logic that if a person is
imprisoned, he or she cannot physically commit a crime.
100
"Selective incapacitation," 10 1 a more precise incapacitation theory,
targets specific criminal conduct. 10 2  Examples of selective
incapacitation include U.S. Three-Strikes statutes,10 3 both U.S.
of imprisonment and noting that the end goal to isolate the prisoner and purge evil from
the criminal mind and body).
94. See O'Connor, supra note 25, at 848. See also Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at
113.
95. See §§ 44-45 of Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (S. Afr.) (providing, for
example, that South Africa's "Department of Correctional Services has established
education and training program[s] to equip prisoners with the knowledge and skills that
are necessary to obtain a job after release from prison."). See also SCHARF &
COCHRANE, supra note 16, Prison Section, para. 3.
96. See generally Willie Hofmeyr, For Some Crimes 'Life' Will Now Mean Exactly
That, Bus. DAY (Johannesburg), Nov. 27, 1997, Analysis, at 14. See also generally
Schonteich, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that South African politicians push for harsher
sentencing measures to combat crime).
97. See § 2 of Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
98. Id. § 2(c).
99. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (explaining how the theory of incapacitation
drives the trend of the United States and South Africa sentencing policies).
100. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 59.
101. Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at 113.
102. See id. at 113-114 (noting that the "Three[-]Strikes statute is grounded in the idea
of selective incapacitation of the most dangerous criminals."). See also O'Connor, supra
note 25, at 848 (explaining that the general premise of selective incapacitation is that
rehabilitation does not help the core group of career criminals).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1994).
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and South African mandatory minimum statutes,104 and South
African maximum sentence statutes. 10 5
Selective incapacitation is the punishment justification driving
the harsh sentencing schemes of both South Africa and the United
States.10 6 Yet, "crime is on the rise in South Africa, '10 7 and the
U.S. prison population consistently grows, even when crime rates
stabilize. 10 8 There is clearly a flaw in these harsh sentencing
provisions. Were they successful, crime would decrease and the
prison population would stabilize; however, the truth is that with
these sentencing provisions in practice, the inmate population in
the United States and South Africa will continue to grow far
beyond the facilities' maximum capacities. 10 9
104. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994) is an example of a U.S. mandatory minimum statute.
See Baylson, supra note 9, at 167 ("Incapacitation for specific terms is guaranteed only by
the existence of mandatory minimum sentences-convicted individuals are removed from
society and incarcerated for the entire period of the mandatory minimum. During that
period, society benefits from the individual's inability to commit further crimes.").
105. § 51 of Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (S. Afr.) is an example of a
South African minimum sentence statute. See Hofmeyr, supra note 96, at 14 (noting that
the criminals who commit the most serious crimes receive the harshest sentences).
106. Some critics argue that strict sentencing is not a form of selective incapacitation.
See THOMAS GABOR, THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR: STATISTICAL
APPROACHES 3 (1986) (proffering that fixed indeterminate sentencing with standardized
criteria is actually a compromise of utilitarian and retributive considerations).
107. Builta, supra note 4, at 1.
108. See Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at 104 (reporting that crime rates have been
relatively stable since the mid-1970s).
109. As of December 1992, 108,698 prisoners occupied South African prisons, which
only had accommodations for 87,706. See SCHARF & COCHRANE, supra note 16, Prison
Section, para. 1. South Africa's prisons remain inadequate; as of 1999, there were 154,506
inmates, with space for only 99,000. See News24.com, supra note 50. See also Beres &
Griffith, supra note 10, at 107 ("[A] factor contributing to the boom in the prison
population was the enactment of stiffer criminal penalties for many crimes."); ALVIN J.
BRONSTEIN, Sentencing Reform Can Reduce Prison Overcrowding, in AMERICA'S
PRISONS OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 90, at 145, 147-148.
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C. Targeting Recidivists
Selective incapacitation undoubtedly targets a certain type of
criminal, such as the career offender. 110 The notion underlying
targeting career offenders is often based on studies and theories
proffering that a small group of criminals commit the bulk of
crime.111 Wolfgang, Figilio, and Sellin conducted an influential
study supporting recidivist statutes.112 The study, conducted in
Philadelphia in 1945 and 1958, involved a cohort 113 of criminal
individuals-the study formulated the "six percent solution,"
concluding that six percent of violent offenders commit seventy
percent of all crime.
114
Reliance on these studies, particularly by U.S. officials,
appears faulty. These studies hinge on the reliability of the
criminal history factor1 15 as a predictor of future crime.116 There
is convincing evidence, however, that criminal history is not
indicative of future behavior. 117  The theory behind the
mandatory minimum sentencing laws and the federal sentencing
guidelines is that potential felons are deterred when they realize
that penalties for certain crimes are more severe. 118 This theory is
flawed, however, because most criminals do not weigh the risks
110. See supra text accompanying notes 103-105 (discussing how harsh sentences
target criminals who commit the most serious crimes and are considered the most
dangerous).
111. See Timothy Egan, A 3-Strikes Law Shows It's Not as Simple as It Seems, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at A18. See also Cuomo, supra note 43, at A19.
112. See O'Connor, supra note 25, at 848 n.7. See also Beres & Griffith, supra note 10,
at 114; GABOR, supra note 106, at 3; Martha Kimes, Note, The Effect of Foreign Criminal
Convictions Under American Repeat Offender Statutes: A Case Against the Use of Foreign
Crimes in Determining Habitual Criminal Status, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 503
n.1 (1997).
113. A "cohort" is "a group of individuals or vital statistics about them having a
statistical factor in common in a demographic study ...... WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 74, at 441.
114. See Egan, supra note 111, at A18. See also Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at 114.
The studies showed that in 1945, six percent of the boys in the cohort committed over fifty
percent of the crimes. See id. Likewise, in 1958, 7.5 percent of the boys in the cohort
committed sixty-one percent of the crimes. See id. Some critics contend that misreading
of these statistics is a common misperception by the criminal justice system. See id. at 114
n.72.
115. See supra text accompanying note 30 (defining "criminal history score").
116. See GABOR, supra note 106, at 50.
117. Three Pennsylvania studies demonstrated that criminal history was a small factor
in the successes and failures of people released on bail. See id.
118. See FORER,supra note 40, at 62.
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involved with increased penalties before committing crimes,
rather, they act impulsively.
119
South Africa may have the same goals as the United States.
For example, the South African Criminal Procedure Act explicitly
labels certain criminals as "habitual' 120 and "dangerous.- 121
Statutes such as this one are drafted with the intent to target
extremely violent offenders who cannot be released back into
society. 122 To better understand why strict sentencing for repeat
offenders is not the most efficient solution to curb recidivism, it is
helpful to examine it as applied to a specific offense, as the
comparison of drug regulations 123 in the following Part illustrates.
IV. COMPARING THE STATUTORY WAR ON DRUGS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa and the United States are just two of the many
countries fighting the war against drugs.124 Both countries have
tried to alleviate this problem with statutes and sentences that
serve to lock up multitudes of offenders for excessive periods of
time.125 Yet, the problem not only continues, in most instances, it
grows. 126  It is unrealistic and much too costly to continue
119. See id.
120. See § 286 of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (S. Afr.) (stating "a superior court
or a regional court.., if it is satisfied that the said person habitually commits offenses and
that the community should be protected against him, declare him [a] habitual criminal..
121. See id. § 286A (stating that "a superior court or a regional court ... if it is satisfied
that the said person represents a danger to the physical or mental well being of other
persons and the community should be protected against him, declare him a dangerous
criminal.").
122. See GABOR, supra note 106, at 6.
123. It is helpful to look at drug laws because drug crimes are often committed
habitually -recognizing the likelihood of repeat drug crime offenders (because of the
lucrative earnings and benefits), the United States counts one serious drug offense as a
"strike." See supra text of statute accompanying note 42.
124. For a discussion regarding the exacerbation of the drug problem in South Africa,
see generally Thomas Callahan, United Against the Creeps, LIVING AFRICA, Nov. 1996, at
40, 40-43; see also Gumisai Mutume, No Need to Hide for Drug Peddlers, ELECTRONIC
MAIL & GUARDIAN, Apr. 9, 1997 (visited Nov. 10, 1999)
<http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97aprl/9apr-drugs.html>. For discussion regarding the
United States' drug problem and the increased use of incarceration resulting therefrom,
see Thomas Szasz, Preface to STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS xix
(1990); see also FORER, supra note 40, at 65, 151.
125. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
126. Although the drug problem may be an old trade, with increased globalization and
international drug markets, the demand always grows. See Callahan, supra note 124, at 40
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responding to the drug problem simply by overcrowding the
prisons or building more prisons. Building more prisons only
accommodates the increasing numbers of severe sentences
incarcerating people for extended periods of time, and in some
cases, forever. 127
A. U.S. Federal Drug Law
The U.S. federal drug law128 scrutinized herein has the
characteristics of both a mandatory minimum sentencing statute
and a Three-Strikes statute. The Three-Strikes statute is arguably
ineffective in achieving the underlying goal of reducing drug-
related crime. More severe penalties and sentences are almost
always cited as the key solutions to deter violent repeat offenders'
criminal appetites. 129 Thus, it begs the question of whether the
use of non-violent crime convictions, such as those for drug
possession and drug dealing, serves the purpose of deterring
violent habitual offenders.
Title 21, Section 841 of the U.S. Code prohibits any person
from knowingly or intentionally manufacturing, distributing, or
possessing any controlled substance. 130 Unlike South Africa's
statute, the U.S. statute lists in detail the quantity of a substance
resulting in a specified term of imprisonment or fine.131 The U.S.
(explaining how the United States Drug Enforcement Administration is becoming
internationally oriented in response to growing international trafficking). In the early
1980s in Pakistan, there were less than 100 heroin addicts; by the mid-1990s the numbers
were over one million. See id. At a crime conference, Sylvaine de Miranda, Director of
Johannesburg's Phoenix House, noted on the growing drug problem in South Africa: "Four
years ago, heroin was almost unobtainable in South Africa .... now free samples of heroin
are often provided when you buy cocaine or crack." Id. at 40-41.
127. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS:
THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF INCARCERATION, 1992-1993 13 (1994).
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
129. Articles often report that one of the main reasons three-strike legislation was
created was to directly respond to violent criminal acts. See Cuomo, supra note 43, at A19;
see also McClain, supra note 23, at 98-99; O'Conner, supra note 25, at 847, 849.
130. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
131. For an example of quantity specifications, see id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), which
provides:
5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount
of-
(I) coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which
cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been
removed;
(II) cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salt of isomers;
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law is more structured than is the South African statute because it
specifies the amounts of contraband that invoke specific
mandatory minimum sentences. 132 Recall that South Africa's
statute failed to quantitatively define the amount of substance
(besides marijuana) required for a conviction. 133 Both the South
African and U.S. statutes may potentially imprison an offender for
up to twenty-five years. 134 In this regard, the U.S. statute is more
devoted to its goal of incapacitating the worst criminals than is
South Africa's statute, in that, as the amount of drugs the offender
possesses increases, so does the severity of the punishment. This
is especially true for proponents of the view that the more drugs
an individual possesses or distributes, the more harm the
individual causes to society.
The U.S. law includes a Three-Strikes component that
imprisons felons for twenty-five years to life upon their third
felony drug conviction. 135 First time offenders convicted under
this statute must first serve the mandatory minimum sentence
before they are eligible for supervised release. 136 The statute does
not allow eligibility for parole during the term of imprisonment.
137
In these respects, the U.S. law is more committed to its goal of
punishing and incapacitating habitual offenders than is the South
African law.
Congress, however, seems to have forgotten that one of the
most commonly stated justifications for harsh sentencing is to
prevent recidivism among "violent" offenders.138 In light of this
fact, the United States should rethink its policy of punishing drug
offenses in the same manner as it punishes serious violent crimes.
Unfortunately, the theory behind this selective incapacitation
aimed at drug offenses, as a whole, is ineffective.
139
(III) ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; or
(IV) any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of
any of the substances referred to in subclasses (I) through (III).
Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(L)-(IV).
132. See generally id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (providing an example of the correlation between
the amount and type of substance possessed and the length of sentence).
133. See § 21(a)(i) of Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 (S. Afr.).
134. See id. § 17(e) (describing South African imprisonment time limits). See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A) (describing U.S. imprisonment time limits).
135. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See supra text accompanying note 129.
139. See Nkechi Taifa, Symposium, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
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B. South Africa's Drug Law
A cursory look at South Africa's drug and drug trafficking
statute1 40 reveals that it is, in some ways, both more lenient and
harsh, than is the U.S. Three-Strikes drug law. 141 It is more
lenient because it mandates that a prison sentence for selling drugs
is not to exceed twenty-five years. 142 Conversely, the statute is
more broad and harsh than its U.S. counterpart because it fails to
specify the amount of controlled substance (for substances other
than dagga143) necessary for an illegal possession conviction.
144
Thus, it leaves open the assumption that any amount of illicit
substance found on a person may warrant a sentence of up to
twenty-five years imprisonment. Moreover, there is a built-in
presumption in this statute: a person possessing a controlled
substance, other than dagga, is presumed to be dealing drugs.
145
Because it can generate a twenty-five year sentence, this
presumption of "guilty of drug dealing until proven innocent" is a
severe one for mere possession of small amounts of drugs. This
line of punishment seems cruel, as well as impractical, considering
the current state of South Africa's overcrowded prisons. 146 Yet,
this measure may be the best South African lawmakers can do
until international relief, in the form of tactics and organizational
efforts, helps with the advent of increased drug crime.147 The
South African statute may be the result of a sheer lack of
manpower to police the streets, particularly with respect to drug
offenses, 148 rather than a strategic plan to incapacitate habitual
offenders.
1994: "Three-Strikes-and-You're-Out"-Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third Time
Felons, 20 DAYTON L. REV 717, 723 (1995).
140. See generally Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 (S. Afr.).
141. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
142. See § 17(e) of Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992.
143. See id. § 21 (1)(a)(i). "Dagga" is a South African term for marijuana. See
Callahan, supra note 124, at 41.
144. See generally Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992.
145. See id. § 21 (1)(a)(iii).
146. See supra text accompanying note 109.
147. See generally Callahan, supra note 124, at 40-43.
148. The South African Narcotics Bureau employs only 340 agents, yet between
approximately 1994 and 1996, thirty-one agents were killed in the line of duty or died as a
result of job related stress. See id. at 42. See also Mutume, supra note 124.
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The South African drug statute, 149 however, may endeavor to
incapacitate offenders in the same manner as does the U.S.
statute. 150 South African officials are trying to emulate the tactics
and efforts the United States employs in combating drug related
crimes.151 South Africa, however, is not winning "the war on
drugs."'152 In fact, if South Africa follows the United States' lead
of employing stricter sentences incarcerating habitual offenders
for life, it will drain the already-limited resources of the South
African Narcotics Bureau, the South African Police, and South
Africa's prison system even more than they currently are.
V. THE DISPROPORTIONATE AFFECT ON MINORITIES
The United States must either take a stand by punishing
strictly violent crimes, such as murder and rape, or find another
mechanism to deal with repeat offenders. It is not coincidental
that the United States and South Africa have histories of racism
against blacks153 -both countries having a disproportionate
amount of arrests and prosecutions of blacks.
154
149. See generally Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992.
150. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
151. The South African legislature adopted laws modeled after U.S. laws targeting
crimes indirectly related to drug dealing, such as money laundering and criminal assets
seizure. See Callahan, supra note 124, at 42-43. South Africa recently passed a statute in
1998, prohibiting money laundering and providing for criminal asset seizure procedures.
See Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (S. Afr.). If South Africa emulates
U.S. money laundering and criminal asset seizure statutes, it may draft future drug statutes
to selectively incapacitate offenders as does the U.S. Three-Strikes law.
152. See generally Callahan, supra note 124, at 40-43. See also Mutume, supra note
124.
153. See generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, BLACK LIBERATION (Oxford Univ.
Press 1995) (providing a comparative history of black ideologies, movements, and
responses to racism in South Africa and the United States). See also generally ANTHONY
W. MARX, MAKING RACE AND NATION (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (comparing South
Africa, the United States, and Brazil, and tracking colonization, slavery, anti-slavery
movements, racial protests, and contemporary racism).
154. See SCHARF & COCHRANE, supra note 16, Prison Section, para. 1. Based on the
daily average number of prisoners from July 1991 to December 1992, the racial breakdown
for prisoners in South Africa was: 4,225 white, 71,811 black, 721 Asian, and 25,511
coloured. See id. "Coloured" means "persons of mixed race." Id. General Overview
Section, para. 3. In the United States, African-Americans are imprisoned at rate that is
alarmingly disproportionate to their numbers in the population. See Taifa, supra note 139,
at 724. In 1995, the increase in the number of African-Americans arrested for drug crimes
was the largest increase of all ethnic groups. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
1996 282 (1997) [hereinafter CRIME REPORTS]. Table 5.4 provides statistics of drug
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If South Africa emulates the United States by formulating
Three-Strike laws and similar incapacitation methods, as trends
reflect it does in other areas of law,155 the disproportionate
amount of blacks imprisoned in South Africa may increase. 156
The U.S. sentencing scheme has been found to disproportionately
affect African-Americans outside the Three-Strikes realm because
of sentencing laws like those distinguishing between "crack" and
powder cocaine. 157 "The sentencing disparities between powder
cocaine and crack cocaine have been well documented, showing
that punishments for these two forms of the same drug are
correlated with the race of the user. .. "158
When comparing the incarceration rates of African-
Americans in the United States and blacks in South Africa, the
statistics are alarming. In both 1991 and 1992, the United States
incarcerated four times more black males than did South
Africa.159 Even more disturbing, in 1992, the number of African-
American men imprisoned in the United States was higher than
the number of those enrolled in higher education institutions.160
Take notice that all of these numbers were reported in the years
following the onslaught of mandatory minimums and sentencing
guidelines. The "war on drugs"'161 also increased arrests and
prosecutions of minorities because the focus of the drug law
enforcement efforts is primarily on inner city communities with
dense populations of ethnic minorities. 162 "Black, Latino and
Asian youths ... were 2.8 times more likely to be arrested for a
violent crime, 6.2 times more likely to end up in adult court and 7
arrests and the races of the corresponding offenders. See id. at 282 tbl.5.5.
155. See Schonteich, supra note 8, at 13 (arguing that current South African law
mandates tough minimum sentences to combat crime; for example, murdering a police
officer now warrants life imprisonment).
156. See SCHARF & COCHRANE, supra note 16, Prison Section, para. 1.
157. See Taifa, supra note 139, at 719.
158. MAUER, supra note 127, at 22.
159. According to the Sentencing Project's findings, in 1991, the U.S. Government
incarcerated 3,109 African-American males per 100,000 people, while the South African
Government incarcerated 729 black males per 100,000 people. See MAUER, supra note 11,
at 3-4. From 1992 to 1993, the United States' rate increased to 3,822 per 100,000 in
comparison to South Africa's 851 per 100,000. See id. at 1, 7.
160. See id. at 2. The number of African-American men in jail or prison in 1992 was
583,000 while the number enrolled in higher education institutions was 537,000. See id.
161. Szasz, supra note 124, at xviii.
162. See Taifa, supra note 139, at 724. See also generally CRIME REPORTS, supra note
154, at 280-284 (discussing the overall increase of drug arrest across the board).
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times more likely to be sent to prison than their white
counterparts.'
163
Whenever there is disparity between the treatment of races
within a criminal justice system, a rise in the overall incarceration
rates ultimately increases the inequity. Thus, it logically follows
that the U.S. and South African Governments should respond to
these phenomena with alternatives other than increased
sentences. This is especially true in light of abundant evidence
that increased sentencing does not decrease crime.
164
Furthermore, there are heavy cost factors associated with
increased sentences and inadequate prison space. 165 Since 1990,
the number of local, state, and federal prisons rose by 676,700 and
is estimated to surpass two million by the end of 2000.166 "Adding
to this tragedy is that despite enormous expenditures on prison
construction and operations, prisons are likely to be as
overcrowded and the public as vulnerable to crime in the year
2000," as it was at the time strict sentencing policies were
implemented.16
7
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO INCREASED SENTENCING
A. Assessing the Sentence Situation
Neither South Africa nor the United States possesses the
ideal sentencing scheme. In fact, both countries continue to pay a
high price for their heavy incarceration practices that overcrowd
prisons. 168 Moreover, some argue that, "the reasoning behind
[habitual offender statutes]169  is flawed because high-rate
163. Ellis Cose, Locked Away and Forgotten, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 54, 54.
164. See Taifa, supra note 139, at 723. "In 1992, of 25,000 offenders imprisoned in New
York State, only 286 were sentenced as three time violent offenders. Thus a 'three strikes'
law would have kept 'only' 286 murderers, rapists, armed robbers and other violent felons
off our streets." Cuomo, supra note 43, at A19. See CHRISTOPHER BAIRD, Building More
Prisons Will Not Solve Prison Overcrowding, in AMERICA'S PRISONS OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS, supra note 90, at 118, 119.
165. See BAIRD, supra note 164, at 119. See also BRONSTEIN, supra note 109, at 146-
149; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Responsible Lawmakers Can Reduce Prison
Overcrowding, in AMERICA'S PRISONS OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 90, at 135,
136-138.
166. See Cose, supra note 163, at 54.
167. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying note 109.
169. See supra Part III.B.3 (explaining that the incapacitation theory of punishment
underlies many harsh sentencing laws).
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offenders will spend a majority of their criminal careers in prison,
even if the prison term is modest and the apprehension rate is low.
Most high-rate offenders are likely to be behind bars regardless of
Three-Strikes laws." 1
70
"We tried soft on crime, and that didn't work. Now we've
tried tough on crime, and the results have been just as
unimpressive. Maybe we should try smart on crime." 171  One
thing is certain: a change in sentencing policies must occur. This
Comment maintains that sentencing is directly correlated to
overcrowding in prisons, but not correlated to crime reduction.
Yet ironically, incapacitation and crime reduction are the alleged
reasons behind the stricter sentences imposed.
172
There are numerous studies connecting poor socioeconomic
conditions with the fostering of criminal behavior. 173 It follows
that strict sentencing may remove the criminal from society, but it
does not eradicate the breeding ground for criminal conduct. As a
result, new criminals will constantly replace the old because the
motivation is omnipresent. Furthermore, upon release from
prison, criminals have little financial or social support to
discourage their criminal motives and help them integrate back
into mainstream society. 174 Additionally, studies indicate that
greater sentences actually lead people to commit repeat
offenses. 175 What good is incapacitation if it only guarantees
deterrence at the high financial and social costs176 of long-term
170. Beres & Griffith, supra note 10, at 123.
171. Marc Mauer, Doing Good Instead of Doing Time, Bus. & SOC'Y REV., Summer
1998, reprinted in AMERICA'S PRISONS OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 90, at 199, 201
(quoting James Bennett, We Must Expand Creative Sentencing, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan.
1990).
172. See supra Part III.B.3 (noting that the incapacitation theory of punishment is most
often cited as the rationale for harsh prison sentences).
173. See GABOR, supra note 106, at 44-47.
174. Judge Forer describes the process of prisoners who "max out" by serving their
entire sentence. Yet, when they are released, there is no support to help the ex-convicts
obtain employment, living arrangements, medical care, or assistance with the host of other
social issues they face. See FORER, supra note 40, at 142.
175. See generally GABOR, supra note 106, at 56-58. Data indicates that less prison
time can have a more favorable outcome than can longer sentences, although, there are an
equal amount of opposite outcomes in some studies. As a whole, the studies indicate that
the level of intervention was related to recidivism and that the more intrusive forms of
intervention had adverse affects. See id.
176. The cost of incarcerating a prisoner can range from $20,000.00 to $40,000.00 a
year. See Taifa, supra note 139, at 722. See also FORER, supra note 40, at 151.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
imprisonment until old age? 177
B. Alternative Sentences and Reform Suggestions
"The National Council on Crime and Delinquency found that
only 18 percent of prisoners had been convicted of serious or very
serious crimes; 29 percent were convicted of moderate crimes, and
53 percent of petty crimes." 178 In 1992 in New York, for example,
of 25,000 imprisoned offenders, only 286 were repeat violent
offenders. 179 With statistics such as these, it is obvious that laws
sentencing all criminals, even non-violent offenders, to lengthy
prison terms, are over inclusive and potentially do more harm
than good.
There are several suggested alternative methods to deal with
non-violent or non-serious offenders. Increasingly, governments
utilize the option of requiring non-violent offenders to pay
restitution to their victims. 180 In addition, more money could go
into programs that help increase post-prison opportunities. For
example, "the Vera Institute of New York . . . found that
misdemeanants fared better when they were referred to work
programs." 181 In a Michigan program, misdemeanants on work
probation 182 had only half the recidivism rate of those on regular
probation.18
3
Other alternatives include utilizing electronic monitoring of
offenders, 184 increasing probationary periods, and providing
177. "Incarcerating an aging prisoner is estimated to cost ... over $60,000.00 a year."
Taifa, supra note 139, at 722.
178. FORER, supra note 40, at 159.
179. See supra text accompanying note 164.
180. See FORER, supra note 40, at 122. In a study of 605 of Judge Forer's consecutive
cases, two thirds of the offenders involved therein served probation and paid restitution;
moreover, they were not re-arrested. See id. at 123. See also Mauer, supra note 171, at
202.
181. FORER, supra note 40, at 150.
182. The misdemeanants were sentenced to probation on the condition that they work
and pay restitution to their victims. See id.
183. See id.
184. Examples of these devices include ankle bracelets and other forms of computer-
tracking devices monitoring the offender's movements from his or her home. See generally
Russell Carlisle, Electronic Monitoring as an Alternative Sentencing Tool, GA. ST. B.J.,
Feb. 1998, reprinted in AMERICA'S PRISONS OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 90, at 214,
214-221. But see generally Steven G. Calabresi, Designer Sentences and the Justice System,
AM. ENTERPRISE, Jan.-Feb. 1990, reprinted in AMERICA'S PRISONS OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS, supra note 90, at 206, 206-213 (explaining that creative sentences should not
be used because they tend to be tailored to the affluent, and it is unclear as to whether
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better training for probation personnel. Some sources indicate
that methods such as these would cost a mere fraction of the total
cost of imprisonment.
185
In addressing the disparate effect of increased incarceration
and strict sentencing on blacks, some propose that a National
Commission should be established to focus on the sentencing and
incarceration policies and how they affect minorities.186 Along the
same lines, Marc Mauer of the Sentencing Project, suggests a
review of socioeconomic factors and their effects on crime.
1 87
Mauer recommends that the General Accounting Office examine
socioeconomic circumstances such as unemployment, school
dropout rates, and access to health care in relation to crime.
188
These suggestions could be helpful because they would provide
national organizations an opportunity to observe the other effects
of increased sentencing, outside the traditional realm of the
criminal justice system. An outside perspective may make officials
and constituents recognize the detrimental causal effects of
Draconian sentencing trends.
An obvious sentencing reform measure, especially in the
United States, is to end the "war on drugs." For many reformists,
the increased sentencing measures for drug crimes have not only
failed, but also have worsened matters.189  Some reformists
recommend that the drug problem be treated as public health
concern rather than a criminal justice problem.
190
Lastly, in regards to statutory changes, many sources point to
mandatory sentencing laws as the principle source of prison
overcrowding. 191 These laws could be repealed, and in fact, they
have been known to "thwart the purposes of a sentencing
guidelines system designed to introduce a rational basis into
they actually reduce prison time).
185. See FORER, supra note 40, at 159. See also generally JOHN P. CONRAD, Intensive
Probation is Effective, in AMERICA'S PRISONS OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 90, at
230, 230-236. But see Michael Tonry, Stated and Latent Functions of ISP, 36 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 174, 174-181, 183-186, 188-189 (1990), reprinted in AMERICA'S PRISONS
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 90, at 238, 238-245 (arguing that intensive probation
programs do not reduce prison overcrowding or save money, but rather are simply an
unrelenting form of surveillance).
186. See MAUER, supra note 11, at 12.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Szasz, supra note 124, at xx.
190. See MAUER, supra note 127, at 24.
191. See FORER, supra note 40, at 151.
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sentencing. "192
VII. CONCLUSION
South Africa and the United States have been the world
leaders in incarceration rates for far too long. 193 This Comment
demonstrates that stricter sentences aimed at preventing
recidivism remain a large cause of this phenomenon. As the new
millennium begins, it is time to spend government dollars wisely
and take a long-term approach to recidivism. Legislatures must
explore the social reasons causing offenders to habitually turn to
crime. 194 Moreover, they must examine alternatives other than
the quick fixes of long sentences, more prisons, and vast monetary
expenditures because:
Important as the criminal justice system is, it is only one small
facet of the social order. It is a reactive system, not proactive.
It can respond only after crime has been committed and only on
a one-by-one basis. It is unreasonable to expect such a system
to make material changes in a society and its culture.
195
The renowned philosopher, Plato, expressed this Comment's
theme best when he said, "[t]he Law, like a good archer, should
aim at the right measure of punishment.'
'196
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